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Energy has become a major issue in the agenda of governments, institutions, business firms 
and the public.  Preventing global warming while meeting the world’s energy needs is of 
critical importance to the sustainability of the planet (IES, 2008).  However, the demand for 
non-renewable resources continues to rise with continued population growth further 
exacerbating the situation.  Between 1945 and 2009 the world’s population increased from 2 
billion to 6.2 billion and the OECD estimates that the planet will have nearly 9 billion people 
by 2050.  Population growth will occur mainly in the developing regions of the world where 
energy needs will rise significantly.  World consumption of electricity is estimated to grow at 
2.4% per year between 2006 and 2030 with higher levels of growth in China and India (IAE, 
2008).  However, electricity production is dominated by fossil fuels combustion such as 
petroleum, coal and natural gas.  These production processes are a major cause of global 
warming through greenhouse gad emissions.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) estimates that the world temperature can rise from 1.1 to 6 degrees Centigrade 
before the next century with devastating environmental and social consequences.  Dramatic 
reductions on greenhouse gas emissions coupled with fundamental changes in the traditional 
energy production model are needed to ensure planetary survival.    
 Given the political and economic power of the global fossil fuel lobby energy experts 
admit that the traditional energy model will be hard to replace. Renewable energy sources 
such as biomass, solar power, wind power, geothermal energy and hydroelectric energy only 
represent 3% of the world consumption. Investment in these technologies could reduce the 
world’s dependence on fossils but the capacity to invest in non-renewable energy and the 
technological capability is unevenly distributed.  Our inability to stock energy is also a 
problem because renewable sources do not produce energy continuously.  There are ongoing 
efforts to provide solutions to the energy storage problem as in Germany where plans are 
underway to build an energy distribution network that would connect wind power stations in 
the north of the country with solar power stations in the south.  However these developments 
are limited to a select few industrialized countries.  
 In the context of energy sources the nuclear power industry has an ambiguous status.  
While many institutions and governments consider nuclear energy as a ‘sustainable’ solution 
to the energy crisis there are serious concerns about the safety and ecological impact of the 
industry as well as the treatment of radioactive waste.  Nuclear power corporations are often 
the targets of activist green groups and there is both a material and ideological battle currently 
being waged about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy.  
 3 
In this paper we describe how the sustainability debate is being played out in a nuclear 
power corporation and how the discourse influences the way corporate managers translate 
sustainable development into practices.  Our case study focuses on one of the world’s largest 
nuclear power generators and describes how the company manages the conflicting interests of 
its key stakeholders.  We show how by managing different stakeholders – from those opposed 
to nuclear power to those that support nuclear power to others that have neutral views – the 
corporation is able to sustain its economic growth strategy while shaping the debate about 
sustainability to a ‘sustaining growth’ paradigm.  We argue that despite public espousals of 
integrating social and environmental concerns in an aim to make the nuclear industry more 
‘sustainable’ there is no significant shift in the corporate world view with a ‘business as usual’ 
approach that places a priority on economic growth.      
 
The sustainability discourse: From planetary sustainability to corporate sustainability 
 Discourses of sustainable development emerged in the 1980s as evidence of the 
negative environmental and social consequences of economic growth mounted.  It is a 
concept that is mired in much confusion and ambiguity with more than 100 ‘definitions’ 
(Faber, Jorna, & Engelen, 2005).  The widely used Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development as ‘a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, direction of 
investments, orientation of technological development and institutional change are made 
consistent with future as well as present needs’ (WCED 1987: 9) is more of a slogan than a 
definition. Apart from attempting to reconcile economic growth with environmental 
protection, the sustainable development agenda of Brundtland also focuses on social justice 
and human development within the framework of social equity and the equitable distribution 
and utilization of resources.  Despite its broad appeal as a concept sustainable development 
has been critiqued by several scholars who argue that it is unclear on the nature of human 
‘needs and wants’, continues to promote a growth model, relies on market mechanisms to 
ensure that environmental and social concerns will be addressed and promotes neo-colonial 
modes of development by obscuring significant differences in resource access and utilization 
between countries (Bandy, 1996; Banerjee, 2003; Escobar, 1992; McAfee, 1999; Redclift, 
1987).  Proponents of sustainable development claim that it marks a fundamental paradigm 
shift in the way development should proceeds while its critics argue that it is still business as 
usual tinged with some green credentials.  Economic growth continues to be privileged except 
that it is now recast as sustainable growth with conventional notions of capital, income, and 
growth continuing to inform this ‘new’ paradigm.  Rather than reshaping markets and 
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production processes to fit the logic of nature, sustainable development uses the ‘logic of 
markets and capitalist accumulation to determine the future of nature’ (Shiva 1991: 121). 
 It is not surprising that discourses of sustainability at the level of corporate strategy 
reflect market-based approaches instead of political and institutional interventions.  For 
instance, one of the aims of the ‘Vision of Sustainable Development’ promoted by the 
Business Council for Sustainable Development is to ‘maintain entrepreneurial freedom 
through voluntary initiatives rather than regulatory coercion’ (Newton & Harte, 1997: 91).  
And perhaps the ultimate triumph of corporate control of sustainability is the Dow Jones 
‘Sustainability Index’ which defines a sustainable corporation as one ‘that aims at increasing 
long-term shareholder value by integrating economic, environmental and social growth 
opportunities into its corporate and business strategies’ (Dow Jones Sustainability Group, 
2000).  It is interesting to note the discursive shift from planetary sustainability to corporate 
sustainability.  The underlying assumption is that corporations must be sustainable for the 
planet to be sustainable.  And that corporate sustainability is possible only if environmental 
and social issues result in ‘growth opportunities’.   Robert Shapiro, the ex-CEO of Monsanto 
sums up the business approach aptly: ‘Far from being a soft issue grounded in emotion 
or ethics, sustainable development involves cold, rational business logic’ (Magretta 1997: 81).  
 While there is no doubt that corporations play a significant role in achieving 
sustainability it is simplistic to assume that current environmental practices are compatible 
with notions of sustainability.  Most companies focus on operational issues when it comes to 
greening and lack a ‘vision of sustainability’ (Hart 1997).  Instead theoretical attempts to 
integrate environmental and social issues into corporate strategy have focused on the social 
role of corporations.  Concepts like corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social 
responsiveness, corporate citizenship as well as a host of models, categories and taxonomies 
an attempt to define the social responsibilities of corporations.  Carroll’s (1979) categories of 
CSR as consisting of economic, legal, ethical and discretionary responsibilities have been 
influential in understanding the nature and type of obligations that business has to society.  
According to Carroll (1979, p. 500) the fundamental social responsibility for any business 
firm in this framework is its economic responsibility – ‘to produce and services that society 
wants and to sell them for a profit’.  Other responsibilities and roles are framed from this 
fundamental assumption – corporations are expected to follow all necessary laws while 
seeking to make profits and they are expected to behave ethically in areas that are not codified 
by law.  
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While the primary function of the firm is economic (normatively defined as enhancing 
shareholder value) some scholars have challenged the shareholder primacy theory of the firm 
arguing that focusing purely on the economic function of the firm ignores the complexity that 
firms have to deal with along with related inefficiencies, information asymmetries and 
multiple incentive problems.  They propose a stakeholder theory of the firm that broadens a 
firm’s role to include other external and internal actors apart from shareholders (Donaldson, 
1999; Hill and Jones, 1992).  Freeman (1984) provided probably the most widely accepted 
definition of a stakeholder defining stakeholders as ‘any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the organization’s objectives’.  This broad view is not without its problems: 
different stakeholders have differing interests and balancing the needs of competing 
stakeholders is not an easy task.  CSR and stakeholder theory also have their fair share of 
critics – some see CSR activity as ‘theft’ from a firm’s key stakeholder groups: shareholders, 
customers and employees (Friedman, 1962) while others argue that CSR serves as a 
smokescreen even a form of ‘stakeholder colonialism’ that serves to regulate stakeholders 
(Banerjee, 2000), and is an ‘ideological movement’ intended to legitimize the power of 
multinational corporations (Mitchell, 1989).   
Theoretical approaches to a stakeholder theory of the firm have focused on its 
descriptive, instrumental and normative aspects (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Descriptive 
approaches have focused on understanding managerial perceptions about stakeholder salience, 
the role of the board and organizational-stakeholder relationships.  Instrumental approaches 
have focused on the consequences of serving stakeholders, particularly the financial benefits 
generated by such a strategy.  The normative justification of stakeholder theory has its roots 
philosophical and moral arguments about fairness and reciprocity (Phillips, 1997), Kantian 
ethics and justice (Bowie, 1999), theories of social contracts (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994), 
as well as notions of corporate integrity and cooperative relationships with the community 
(Solomon, 1994). 
However, as Margolis and Walsh (2003) have pointed out the ‘practical necessities’ of 
stakeholder theory have meant that normative justifications beyond that of providing 
shareholder value have not gained significant ground in theory or practice. The focus is 
almost entirely on win-win situations where a particular ‘social’ initiative is evaluated by its 
economic benefit to the firm. Commenting on the results of a meta-analysis of more than 25 
years of empirical studies on the link between corporate economic and social performance, 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) claimed that the literature was ‘over inclusive’ in defining 
organizational stakeholders and called for a more ‘restrictive’ concept of stakeholders in order 
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to establish a stronger link.  This implies a focus on stakeholders who can influence the 
financial or competitive position of the firm, leaving little or no resources directed to serve the 
interests of marginalized stakeholder groups (Banerjee, 2007).  
To summarize, we can discern three approaches to stakeholder theory in the literature: 
the shareholder value perspective which sees stakeholder theory as a ‘dangerous distortion of 
business principles’, the stakeholder value perspective aimed at making corporations more 
socially responsible by balancing the needs of different stakeholders and the managerial 
perspective, a ‘middle way’ that identifies salient stakeholders in order to manage them 
efficiently.  Despite some attempts to broaden the role of the firm using more inclusive 
normative criteria the dominant approach in stakeholder theory and practice focuses on a 
narrow list of stakeholders whose interests and influence directly relate to a firm’s economic 
interest.  As Roberts (2003, p. 251) points out at best these ‘win-win’ CSR policies can 
produce ‘moments of calculated cooperation when reciprocal self-interests coincide and 
ethical justification can take the form only of an argument that ethics pays’.  
 An influential framework to determine stakeholder salience was developed by 
Mitchell et al. (1997) who classified stakeholders based on their possession of three attributes: 
power (the stakeholder’s power to influence the company), legitimacy (of the stakeholder’s 
relationship with the company) and urgency (the extent to which the stakeholder’s demands 
require immediate attention).  While this framework has been critiqued because of its 
inadequate analysis of power and legitimacy (Banerjee, 2000) it remains a widely used 
descriptive framework.  Senior managers of corporations determine the salience of 
stakeholders and those deemed salient tend to receive management attention.  Typically, 
corporations tend to focus on stakeholders with higher levels of power, legitimacy and 
urgency: the demands of these ‘definitive’ stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997) normally get the 
attention of top management.  Interestingly, Mitchell et al. (1997: 878) define the group of 
stakeholders who have urgency and power but ‘lack’ legitimacy as ‘dangerous stakeholders’ 
and deplore their actions as being ‘outside the bounds of legitimacy, dangerous both to the 
stakeholder-manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved’.  They single 
out ‘wildcat strikers’ and ‘coercive environmentalists’ as examples of dangerous stakeholders.  
While a few anti-nuclear protests have turned violent and some actions of ‘coercive 
environmentalists’ may not be seen as legitimate it is not accurate to portray these groups as 
lacking legitimacy.  Rather, it is their influence on the general public, governments and the 
media that can determine the level and extent of corporate responses to environmental 
activism.   
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 As we will see in our case study, in the context of the nuclear industry managers 
identified three groups of stakeholders whom they considered were crucial for the future of 
the nuclear power industry.  The groups differed in their power to influence company policies 
but nevertheless received varying degrees of attention from corporate managers.  Supportive 
stakeholders were organizations and institutions that were in favor of nuclear power and saw 
it as a clean energy source with manageable risks.  This group included international 
institutions, some governments, non-governmental organizations, scientific associations and 
industry associations.  Obstructive stakeholders were anti-nuclear and environmental activist 
groups whose policy was to completely phase out all existing nuclear power reactors and 
prevent any new ones from being constructed.  Passive stakeholders consisted of the general 
public and sections of civil society that did not hold strong views about the benefits or risks of 
nuclear power.  They did not oppose government or corporate plans to expand nuclear plans 
so in a sense provided tacit support for the nuclear power industry.  This stakeholder group 
has some similarities with dormant stakeholders identified by Mitchell et al. (1997) as groups 
that had power but no legitimacy or urgency except that in our case passive stakeholders as 
members of the general public certainly are legitimate actors.             
 
The study setting  
  The nuclear industry provides 16% of the world energy consumption. The world 
nuclear capacity in 2007 was 372 GW of which about 309 GW is in the OECD countries. The 
nuclear energy market is geopolitical and highly regulated.  It involves three key actors: 
international agencies, governments and private or public electricity suppliers. Because of 
weapons proliferation concerns, the market is strictly controlled by international agencies.  
Nuclear power corporations can only sell nuclear plants to countries that have ratified the Non 
Proliferation treaty of 1968 accept regular monitoring and inspections from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.  Governments are key actors in the nuclear power industry because 
they have the authority to commission new nuclear reactors and negotiate with nuclear power 
corporations and international agencies.  Local electricity suppliers play more of an 
operational role in developing and maintaining nuclear power stations and the linked 
electricity distribution network.  Table 1 identifies the key international and national agencies 
that regulate the nuclear power industry in France. In this example, we can see that there are 
other regulatory agencies that control suppliers and customers, provide security and safety, 
radioactivity protection and actively participate in radioactive waste management at the 
national scale.  
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Key international agencies 
AIEA: International Atomic Energy 
Agency 
International nuclear energy control, fight against 
proliferation 
NEA: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Coordinate and promote civil nuclear power in 
OECD countries 
EURATOM Secure nuclear supply for European countries 
 
National nuclear supervision 
DIREM : General direction of Energy 
and raw material, direction of 
energetic and mineral resources  
Nuclear sector supervision, international civil 
nuclear follow-up  
DIDEME : General direction of 
Energy and raw material, direction of 
energy markets 
EDF supervision 
ASN : Nuclear safety authority Nuclear safety and radioprotection control  
HFD : Official of Defence  Raw material, nuclear plants and nuclear 
transportation safety  
IRSN : radioprotection and nuclear 
safety institute   
Safety and radioprotection experts 
ANDRA: National agency for 
radioactive waste management 
Radioactive waste management 
 
French Nuclear power industry corporations  
CEA Nuclear fuel and reactors research center 
AREVA-NP Conception and maintenance of nuclear stations 
and nuclear fuel provider 
EDF Electricity public supplier, construction and 
exploitation of nuclear stations  
AREVA-NC Fuel cycle: mining, uranium enrichment, recycle 
and fuel retreatment 
 
Table 1 
Key Regulatory Agencies in the French Nuclear Power Industry 
 
Source: French Ministry of Economy, finance and industry, DGEMP, 27/11/2006. 
 
 While these regulatory agencies are important stakeholders for nuclear power 
corporations their main roles is monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulation.  
Most firms adopt a compliance strategy in dealing with regulatory agencies, however these 
agencies do provide social legitimacy for the nuclear industry.  The nuclear power industry is 
relatively young but has an eventful history of protests, accidents leading to death and disease 
and deeply divided yet paradoxically ambiguous perceptions.  Once universally considered as 
an expensive and dangerous form of energy generation the nuclear industry appears to have 
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received a new lease of life thanks to concerns about greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.  Advocates of nuclear power point to the ability of the sector to produce continuous 
energy in large quantities without emitting greenhouse gases.  According to the International 
Energy Agency, world demand for nuclear energy should increase because of economic 
growth in developing countries, rising fossil fuel prices and increasing CO² emissions (IEA, 
2008).  It is estimated that nuclear energy could comprise between 30% to 40% of world 
energy consumption by 2050 (DGEMP-DIREM, 2006).  Table 2 shows the number of nuclear 
plants currently under construction. 
 
Country Number of reactors Capacity (MW) 
Argentina 1 692 
Bulgaria 2 1 906 
China 6 5 220 
Chinese Taipei 2 2 600 
Finland 1 1 600 
France 1 1 600 
India 6 2 910 
Iran 1 915 
Japan 2 2 166 
Korea 3 2 880 
Pakistan 1 300 
Russia 7 4 724 
Ukraine 2 1 900 
United States 1 1 165 
Total 36 30 578 
 
Table 2 
Nuclear power plants under construction as of August 2008 
 
 
Source : IAEA PRIS Database (available at www.iaea.org) 
Note from IAEA: Installed capacity is net (electricity only). 
 
 However, while world demand for nuclear energy is on the rise some countries like 
Germany, Belgium and Sweden have implemented policies to phase out nuclear power, 
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mainly because of safety concerns expressed by their citizens.  The anti-nuclear lobby in these 
countries is quite powerful and has been successful in influencing public perception of the 
nuclear industry as dangerous and environmentally destructive.  While world nuclear capacity 
is estimated to rise from 372 GW to 433 GW by 2030 the nuclear capacity of the European 
Union is expected to decrease from 131 GW to 89 GW during the same period (IEA, 2008). 
The global nuclear industry therefore finds itself at a crossroads between economic growth 
and  environmental and safety concerns amidst a complex changing political environment that 
can be hostile or supportive depending on geopolitical contexts. 
The uncertain external environment and concerns about climate change and global 
warming also present a business opportunity for nuclear energy corporations to jump on and 
direct the bandwagon of ‘sustainable development’.  Several leading nuclear power 
corporations now have mission statements about how their operations contribute to 
sustainable development and how their vision and values reflect the Millennium goals of the 
United Nations of eradicating poverty, providing energy access to people and acting 
responsibly toward the environment.  For example, the U.S. nuclear corporation 
Westinghouse declares that its primary goal is ‘to satisfy the world's growing demand for 
energy’ and being ‘safe and environmentally responsible’ (Westinghouse, 2009).  The British 
firm BNFL declares in its mission statement that is a ‘responsible, responsive and sustainable, 
long-term business’ (BNFL, 2009).  And the French corporation AREVA defines its mission 
as ‘providing its customers with solutions for carbon-free power generation’ and ‘has a 
leading role to play in meeting the world’s energy needs’.  The company also declares that 
‘sustainable development is a core component of the group’s industrial strategy’ (Areva, 
2009).  
Beyond such bold statements that have more than a tinge of green washing how do 
these nuclear power corporations integrate the concept of sustainable development into their 
strategy?  Our case study was conducted with one of the world’s largest nuclear power 
corporations who at the time of the study were in the process of implementing a sustainable 
development strategy in it all its operations.  As we will see the corporation adopted a strategy 
of ‘sustainable growth’ a discourse that it has created through its interaction with a diverse 
group of external and internal stakeholders.  
 Our study was designed to understand managerial perceptions of sustainability and 
stakeholder engagement in a nuclear power corporation.  We therefore chose to use a 
grounded theory approach using a single case study.  During a two year period starting in 
2005 data were collected through interviews, document analysis and observations in a number 
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of sites.  A total of 120 interviews comprising more than 2000 pages of transcribed text were 
conducted.  In addition, 96 internal and external documents and reports were analyzed and 
four research journals (more than 500 pages of text) describing empirical observations were 
maintained during the data collection period.  Each interview lasted for 90 minutes and 
respondents came from different organizational levels as shown in Table 3.  Interviews were 
tape-recorded and fully transcribed.  Respondents were recruited for the study using a 
snowball sampling strategy. 
 
Hierarchical level   No. of Respondents                                            
                        
  Corporate executives      21       Functional managers    15        Administrative employees   20       Secretaries        5         Corporate advisors       2         Operational managers   23                      Foremen     14           Technicians       8            Operators     12      
 
                                                                Total        120        
 
Table 3 
Study Participants 
  
 Respondents were asked three initial questions about (1) their subjective 
understandings of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility (2) the 
company’s commitment to these concepts, and (3) how they would define the current context 
and stakeholders of the nuclear industry.  They were then asked to describe the type of actions 
conducted by the company they felt were related to sustainable development.  Data analysis 
was conducted using criteria and procedures following Straus & Corbin’s (1990) grounded 
theory approach.  Interviews were first coded through a thematic analysis.  Sections of text of 
varying lengths that reflected particular meanings or concepts were coded and named 
(D'Unrug, 1974).  For example, the term ‘triple bottom line’ was coded as ‘balancing 
economic, social and environmental stakes’ and every paragraph or line expressing similar 
ideas were included in that theme.  A constant comparison procedure was then used to 
generate new and coherent categories of meaning.  The process involved comparing data from 
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different respondents as well as responses from individual interviews at different sections of 
the narrative in an effort to enrich the meanings of existing categories or develop new ones.  
Axial coding was then used by comparing categories by identifying relationships between the 
themes generated and when needed some categories were combined to reflect a second order 
of meaning of a broader concept.  A category list was then generated with relevant concepts 
identified by respondents that related managerial perceptions of sustainability and stakeholder 
attributes to concrete translation of sustainability into organizational practices.  In the next 
section we will first present an overview of the current nuclear energy context. Then, we 
discuss the findings from our case study that relate to managerial perceptions of stakeholders 
in the nuclear industry and organizational strategies to respond to stakeholder needs.  Our 
analysis identifies three categories of stakeholders: supportive, obstructive or passive.  We 
also identified a range of organizational responses to address the competing demands of their 
stakeholders that can be broadly described as a ‘sustainable growth’ strategy. 
 
Results 
 Our findings indicate that organizational members differentiate three groups of 
stakeholders that are crucial for the future of nuclear power industry: those who support the 
industry, those who are strongly against this industry and the largest group - those who are 
neutral and passive in this debate.  After discussing the attributes of each of these groups, we 
will show how managers negotiate what we call a ‘stakeholder paradox’ by converging 
divergent stakeholder views into a ‘sustainable growth’ paradigm.  Sustainable development 
was translated as sustainable growth stemming from the organization’s strategy to serve the 
interests of its supportive stakeholders, promoting environmental responsibility to its 
obstructive stakeholders in an attempt to enhance the organization’s legitimacy and avoiding 
risks that could create negative perceptions among passive stakeholders.  A key finding was 
that the nuclear power corporation’s strategy was strongly driven by external stakeholders.  
This has implications for both policy and civil society because for any meaningful 
environmental initiatives to take place targeting external stakeholders may lead to more 
comprehensive actions by nuclear energy corporations.  
 
Supportive stakeholders  
 According to respondents, their supportive stakeholders are governments and 
international institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), 
United Nations for Sustainable Development (UNSD) and Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) through the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). These 
stakeholders are powerful because they set the energy agenda and rules of the game at 
national and international levels.  While governments have been traditional allies of the 
French nuclear energy industry there is increasing interest in developing nuclear energy from 
international institutions mainly motivated by concerns about climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Governments literally created the nuclear industry starting from its original 
military use during World War II and the subsequent arms race during the Cold War period. 
Civilian nuclear programs were marginal until the oil crisis on 1973 when nuclear energy 
emerged as a potential substitute for electricity production.  However, the technological 
sophistication that was required along with proliferation risks limited the numbers of 
countries that were allowed to develop civil nuclear programs.  At the international level as 
well as the national level, decisions about new product development, construction of nuclear 
stations and radioactive waste storage area were taken by the government assisted by the 
scientific community and defense ministries.  The current debate about the rights of Iran and 
North Korea to develop its own civil nuclear program reflects the powerful geopolitical nature 
of the nuclear energy industry.  
 In France, the government has always been proud and supportive of its nuclear 
industry and promoted its expansion, often disregarding civil society claims and expectations.  
However, governments can change and be replaced by other governments who may not be as 
supportive of nuclear energy.  The respondents in our study were acutely conscious of the 
potential for a significant policy shift that could hurt the nuclear energy industry especially 
after the nuclear phase-out policy following a change in the German government in 2001, as 
some of the quotes below indicate. 
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Sustainable development 
manager, n°2, case A) 
 
 
“We cannot forget the German case. Government can be very 
supportive and the French one is like that, but we know that the 
nuclear phase-out policy can be an electoral promise. It is a big deal 
for us.” 
 
(Sales manager, n°13, case 
A) 
 
“Governments are our first customers and we have to satisfy them. 
And they have to satisfy citizens if they want to be re-elected. More 
than government, it is people that we have to convince.” 
 
 
(Operational manager, n°69, 
case 1) 
 
“We have not problem with governments. Only when we don’t 
respect the law but this is normal. Otherwise, they help us because 
they understand the relevance and complexity of our job. They 
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understand it better than people who always fight against us.” 
 
 
 Growing concerns about climate change created a new set of allies for the nuclear 
energy industry: international institutions such as United Nations Division for Sustainable 
Development, the World Bank and the OECD.  According to some respondents the pro-
nuclear energy policy of international institutions were motivated by both economic and 
environmental interests as indicated by the quotes below: 
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Sustainable development 
manager, n°1, case A) 
 
 
“The idea is that there is no development without energy. So if you 
want to develop, you must produce energy to respond to the growing 
energy demand. The current model is based on fossil fuel. So we need 
to do something else and the nuclear power generation appears as a 
potential actor for international institutions. Because we can produce 
lot of energy and answer to a part of the demand, not the all demand, 
but a part.” 
 
(Financial Control manager, 
n°35, case A) 
 
“You know, the major problem of the century is the climate change. 
It is linked to greenhouse gas coming from the transformation of 
petroleum, coal, gas… the nuclear industry does not contribute to 
climate change. These people [Institutions] like us for that. We do not 
pollute the environment! well… nuclear industry has others problems 
and risks, such as radioactive waste, that we have to deal with…” 
 
 
(Corporate strategy 
manager, n°8, case A) 
 
 
“The amazing think is that the nuclear industry was always 
considered as opposite to sustainable development because of waste. 
But now, sustainable development is an ally because of climate 
change. Now the nuclear power industry is the solution to 
environmental issues! Have a look on UN or GIEC report concerning 
nuclear industry, they are strongly with us, we were the 
environmental evil and now, we are angel!” 
 
 For these international institutions, the nuclear power industry can produce continuous 
energy, has a high initial cost but a low cost during his life, and can meet the world’s growing 
energy needs emitting greenhouse gas or using fossil fuels.  Dangers of radioactive waste and 
accidents are minimized through a strong belief that science and technology will find a way to 
reduce these risks.  Energy policies of most international institutions are in line with the 
Nuclear Energy Agency policy which states: ‘The analysis of nuclear energy characteristics 
within a sustainable development framework shows that the approach adopted within the 
nuclear energy sector is generally consistent with the fundamental sustainable development 
goal of passing on a range of assets to future generations while minimizing environmental 
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impacts and burdens’ (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2007).  Functional and operational managers 
in our study also echoed the view of nuclear power as a sustainable and clean source of 
energy and cited the claims of key institutional actors to make their case. 
 
Obstructive stakeholders 
 In direct contrast to the pro-nuclear energy view of supportive stakeholders is the 
position of obstructive stakeholders whose goal is the cessation of all nuclear activities both 
for civil and military purposes.  Respondents cited Greenpeace and Sortir du nucléaire as the 
two most prominent environmental activist groups in France who were aggressively opposed 
to nuclear power.  However, most respondents felt that the activist views were ‘extreme’ and 
not shared by a majority of the population as the following quotes illustrate:   
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Communication director, 
n°5, case A) 
 
 
“You have to understand that we face people whose job is to fight 
against us. They are not many but they work hard. They want to close 
our activity and they can be very aggressive. The good thing is that it 
obliges us to be more rigorous than others because if we make a 
mistake, they won’t forgive us.” 
 
(Quality manager, n°23, 
case B) 
 
“I spent 31 years in this company […] Anti-nuclear have always been 
violent and dangerous. They were obstructing roads for our trucks not 
to circulate, the same of the train. Each time we had a radioactive 
transportation we were afraid to have an accident, not because of us 
but because of them.” 
 
 
(Corporate jurist, n°22, case 
A) 
 
 
“We have often legal contentious with Greenpeace and “sortir du 
nucléaire”. Last time, it was because of the America’s cup. 
Greenpeace came with a little boat and injured our boat. Sometimes it 
is for civil protestation. The last time it was because of used fuel 
transportation to our nuclear site. We launched a legal action against 
them because they did not respect the 500 meters security perimeter 
around the truck. Defamation and denigration on website is not a big 
deal for us, we just let them do. However, when they use our logo and 
put dead fish or dead head on it, we do something because of brand 
property.”  
  
 
(Foremen, n°107, case 3) 
 
 
“These people say that Hiroshima is because of our industry, nuclear 
test in the Pacific, the hunger in the world also... for them, nuclear 
industry is an evil activity and everybody working in it is a bad 
person that want to build bombs and irradiate people. Many NGOs 
leaders think like that. How do you want to dialogue?” 
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 A former executive director of the mining section explained to us the historical 
background of anti-nuclear protests in France.  According to him the anti-nuclear sentiment 
among sections of the French population became more pronounced when the government 
launched the ‘Superphenix’ project in 1976 which was a prototype plant dedicated to the 
development of a new generation of nuclear reactors.  The decision was taken without any 
dialogue and consultation with civil society actors despite protests by more than 60,000 
people on the plant site.  The protests also turned violent culminating in the killing of a young 
activist by police and injuries to hundreds of protestors.  For anti-nuclear activists in France 
the protest marks a symbolic event in the nuclear debate but also showed the staunch 
unwillingness of French governments to ignore civil society concerns about nuclear energy.  
 
 
(Corporate manager, n°16, 
case A) 
 
 
“At the beginning, civil society felt unconcerned by the nuclear 
power industry, but it begun to be considered very positively during 
the petroleum crisis of 1973. People appreciated when they started to 
be unwilling to pay their fuel bill. The nuclear industry was a promise 
of independency and people agreed. However, the nuclear industry 
was often accused of secret, which was not totally wrong because at 
the beginning the civil nuclear power and the military nuclear power 
were intrinsically merged. In the late 70 and the early 90, civil society 
started to contest this industry. They were violent and we, as 
members of the Cogema Company, did not know how to react, we 
were not used to this. So, we thought:” they are stupid, they don’t 
understand what we are doing” and the dialogue with society, which 
was never very developed, was totally stopped until the early 2000.” 
 
  
 
The main argument against nuclear energy is about the environmental risks and 
dangers posed by the industry especially the inability to contain radioactive proliferation.  
Even countries that do not have nuclear plants can be adversely affected by radioactive 
contamination from nuclear accidents in neighboring countries.  The second criticism is about 
the long-term handling and storage of radioactive waste.  At present there is no technology 
that can treat radioactive waste to make it less dangerous and several activist groups do not 
share the optimism of the scientific community that science would find a way in the future.  
However, the French government certainly shares the scientific community’s optimism as 
reflected in the government’s decision tin 2006 to allocate a radioactive waste storage area 
that can be accessible in the future once a technology to recycle waste is developed.  
Opponents of nuclear power also point to high costs and scarcity of uranium.  Estimates of 
world uranium reserves vary and range between lasting for 42 to 150 years, even up to 300 
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years given technological advances in the recycling of atomic fuel.  Recycling of atomic fuel 
might appear to be a sustainable option but for concerns about proliferation – the recycling 
process uses Plutonium, which is a raw material for nuclear weapons.  High raw material 
costs and expensive recycling processes may affect the growth of the industry in the medium 
and long term.  Nuclear fuel prices have remained relatively low and stable and was seen by 
the company as a competitive advantage, for the moment at least.  Civilian and military 
nuclear industries have always been closely guarded and even civilian reactors produce 
enough radioactive waste that can be used for nuclear weapons.  Western governments are 
also suspicious of Iran and North Korea’s plans to build civilian nuclear plants because of the 
potential for military use of radioactive waste. 
 According to respondents, there are differences in the extent of influence wielded by 
antinuclear activists depending on the nature of governments and civil society in different 
countries.  For instance, the anti-nuclear lobby was successful in shaping public opinion and 
government policy against nuclear power in Germany, Belgium and Sweden.  However, in 
France successive governments have been reluctant to initiate a public debate on nuclear 
power.  For example, in 2007 the French government launched a national democratic debate 
called ‘Grenelle de l’Environnement’ on environmental issues such as energy, water, waste, 
biotechnology and agriculture.  However, President Sarkozy specified that nuclear power 
generation was not part of the discussion despite calls from several environmental 
organizations for a debate on the merits and risks of nuclear power.  While most anti-nuclear 
activists in France claim they are powerless because the government refuses any debate on 
nuclear power our sample respondents did not share this view.  Rather, they felt that anti-
nuclear activists apart from being a ‘nuisance’ had the potential to influence public opinion 
and were a threat to the French nuclear industry.   
 
Passive stakeholders  
 According to respondents passive stakeholders group comprise the largest stakeholder 
group, which is the general public excluding anti-nuclear activists.  Studies commissioned by 
the company show that 80% of the French public does not have a clear opinion on nuclear 
power generation and their lack of opposition was seen as tacit approval for the industry.  
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(corporate advisor, n°61, 
 
“Most people don’t have any opinion about nuclear. They just want to 
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case A) 
 
leave in peace, not pay too much their electricity bill and that it. It is 
not because they don’t care, I think it would be a false analysis of 
their passive attitude, but they are not informed, they can’t really take 
a position.” 
 
 
(Plant director, n°79, case 
2) 
 
“Nuclear power has always been a political and military matter, not a 
citizen’s one. When you ask to people, they often don’t know, they 
start to ask you more questions than give you answer. They are afraid 
about nuclear accident and have been chocked by Chernobyl, but they 
don’t feel as it can happen in France. And you can be sure that if it 
happens in France, it will be a really bad time for us, maybe the end.” 
 
 
 The company surveys also showed that public opinion in France is not based on 
technical knowledge about the nuclear industry but more on ‘ideological and political 
assumptions’.  This so-called passivity of French citizens must be treated with caution 
because opinions could shift dramatically if a serious nuclear accident occurs.  Debates about 
the safety of the nuclear energy industry intensified in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl accidents and several civil society organizations drew public attention to the 
non-transparency of the industry, the risks it poses and the non-democratic modes of 
governance of the industry.  In France, public trust in the government’s handling of nuclear 
accidents fell significantly after Chernobyl when in an effort to quell rising concern about 
contamination from the Chernobyl fall out the French public were told that radiation stopped 
miraculously at the French-German border (D’iribarne, 2007).  Respondents in the study did 
not take the passive stakeholder group for granted and were aware of its potential to become a 
threat to the industry 
 The passive stakeholder group can thus become active if nuclear accidents occur and 
the public is exposed to serious health risks.  They can then demand a change in nuclear 
energy policy from their governments.  Managerial perceptions of different stakeholder 
groups are summarized in Table 3.  In the next section we will describe how managers 
respond to perceived stakeholder interests and what kinds of strategies the company develops 
in order to address stakeholder concerns while ensuring the financial viability of the company 
and the industry.    
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Stakeholders groups Nature Identified  Attributes 
 
Supportive stakeholders 
 
 
International Institutions 
Governments (with few exceptions) 
Scientific groups  
NGOs and non-profit organization 
specialized on nuclear energy 
 
International Monetary Fund 
World bank 
United Nations, UNSD 
GIEC 
European Nuclear society 
France, US, Russia, England 
 
Size : medium group 
Power : high power with 
international capacity 
 
 
Obstructive stakeholders 
 
 
NGOs and non-profit organization 
Environmental activists 
Government (Germany, Belgium, 
Sweden, Austria) 
 
Greenpeace 
Sortir du nucléaire 
No2nuclearpower 
Nuclear free 
The Atomic mirror 
Don’t waste 
Friends of the Earth 
 
 
Size : small 
Power : variable, depending of 
theirs ability to mobilize 
passive stakeholders 
 
Passive stakeholders 
 
 
Citizens 
 
 
 
French citizens 
 
Size : large and diffused group 
Power : high but often not used 
 
Table 4 
Managerial perceptions of stakeholder groups 
 
 20 
 
Corporate stakeholder and sustainability strategies 
 How do managerial perceptions of their organization’s stakeholders translate into 
corporate strategies and actions in the context of sustainability?  Managers saw the current 
preoccupation with sustainable development at the institutional and societal level and concern 
about climate change as a business growth opportunity for the nuclear industry.  Portraying 
nuclear energy as a sustainable energy option was also seen as a way to enhance the 
reputation of the industry which was under attack from anti-nuclear activists as the following 
quotes illustrate:  
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Plant director, n°79, case 
2) 
 
 
“The main idea is to communicate on CO²-free energy generation. 
This is a reputation stake and we needed to have a social acceptation 
to pursue our activities.”  
 
(Sustainable development 
manager, n°1, case A) 
  
The current energy model is focus on fossil fuel generation. But we 
will need to change it and the nuclear power generation appears as a 
sustainable solution to answer to a part of the growing energy needs. 
Furthermore, the key issue of the century is the global warming and 
nuclear do not produce greenhouse gas, so it doesn’t contribute to 
global warming. It’s for that reason that sustainable development is a 
major opportunity for us.” 
 
(Strategy director, n°8, case 
A) 
  
I would say that it is an unbelievable opportunity because sustainable 
development which was traditionally considered as opposed to 
nuclear will be our best ally because of global warming. If we apply 
the logic further, we could say that nuclear power generation is the 
solution to environmental issues.”  
 
(Quality coordinator, n°9, 
case A) 
  
 “For us, I think above all that it’s a strategic approach with huge 
business opportunities.” 
 
(R&D director, n°84, case 
2) 
  
 “We say that nuclear power is a clean energy which does not 
produce CO². It’s an original idea from our president to enhance 
nuclear reputation because the public opinion is very sensitive on this 
subject.” 
 
(Plant director, n°124, case 
n°3) 
  
 “The fact that the corporation makes sustainable development the 
focal point of the group’s industrial strategy is a very important thing 
that allows considering differently the nuclear power industry. 
Associating sustainable development with nuclear is well done in 
terms of corporate reputation and marketing. It’s very good to 
communicate on it.” 
 
 
 21 
Implementing a ‘sustainable growth’ policy was therefore a strategic issue for the company. 
However, the way they could address sustainability issues was strongly constrained by the 
corporate perception of the environment. Respondents described the political, economic and 
social environment of the nuclear industry as being ‘unstable’ and ‘volatile’.  The corporate 
response to instability and volatility could be described as cautiously conservative mirroring 
responses made by individuals in groups when they face uncertain situations – risk-taking 
behavior tends to be minimized and conventional actions are reproduced (Michalon, 2002).  
In this case the company reduced its risk by publicly committing to sustainable development 
and developing social and environmental reporting initiatives while continuing its growth 
strategies.  The corporate approach to sustainable development allowed it to preserve its 
traditional business model and precluded any radical shift in strategy, which could risk 
alienating its supportive stakeholders or providing more support to the anti-nuclear lobby.  
Public espousal of the principles of sustainable development and its translation into 
sustainable growth were consistent with the views of the general public that allowed the latter 
to remain passive.  This need for reducing stakeholders’ perceptions of risk is illustrated by 
the following quotes:  
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(communication director, 
n°5, case A) 
 
 
“We don’t have any right to make mistake, we cannot afford to fake 
anything because NGOs are watchdogs and just wait for this “faux-
pas”. If there is any difference between what we say and what we do, 
the whole industry would be accused and put in danger. For us, it is 
also a reputation stake, with only one mistake, all what we built 
before will be destroyed. You have to remember that some of our 
stakeholders’ job is only to fight again our industry until death. That 
situation obviously obliges us to be more rigorous and careful than 
others.”  
 
 
(Partnership coordinator, 
n°19, case A) 
  
“We always remember that our survival is linked to the social 
acceptation of nuclear power generation. We are at the mercy of 
public opinion. If people say no to nuclear power, it’s over. The 
nuclear power sector knows that it faces a high risk and the social 
acceptation is a crucial issue.”  
 
 
(Operational manager, 
n°128, case 3) 
  
“The crucial issue is risk management. Today, the nuclear is 
considered risky, so we are very sensitive about social trend and 
public opinion variation.” 
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(Institutional relations 
manager, n°16, case A) 
  
“Sustainable development is not a funny and trendy concept; it’s an 
obligation for corporations like ours. The social acceptation is very 
important; it is a survival condition for our group.” 
 
 
 To avoid any risk taking and benefit from the new business opportunity, the company 
had made a public commitment to sustainable development and implemented a ‘sustainable 
growth’ strategy, which involved pursuing economic growth while taking into account the 
environmental and social impacts.  The organizational translation of this sustainable growth 
goal was made through a new management system consistent with the ‘triple bottom line 
strategy and the Global Reporting Initiative Management tool (GRI).  A global reporting 
system was developed by the corporate headquarter that provided guidelines to subsidiaries’ 
managers to report on economic, environment and social aspects of their business.  For 
example, one strategy was about ‘reducing consumption’ and the company identified a four 
step process by which this could be achieved.  All units were asked to report their progress 
toward the four steps and develop progression plans.  The ones that were able to achieve the 
last step received recognition from the board: 
1) The plant reduces the consumption of resources on which it can immediately realize a 
significant cost-reduction. 
2) The plant makes a strategic environmental analysis to define its entire environmental 
impact. 
3) The plant implements a systematic eco-efficiency process (cost analysis, energy 
efficiency, and alternate processes) and sets an annual action plan with performance 
objectives. 
4) The plant uses life cycle analysis and invests in R&D to optimize its consumptions. 
Suppliers are selected according to the plant’s need to improve the environmental 
performance of its products and manufacturing processes. The plant communicates the 
improvements to its stakeholders. 
Every subsidiary is expected to follow the same guidelines and use the same tools to 
assess performance.  However, on further probing most respondents explained that this new 
global management system was not an innovation for the nuclear power sector because it has 
always been very cautious about environmental issues as the following quotes illustrate: 
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Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Sustainable development 
director, n°1, case A) 
  
« It was not a revolution but an evolution. It was important for us to 
maintain ours previous way of doing and show to people that it was 
only an improvement of the existing management system. I don’t 
want to talk about change. Change scares everybody. We wanted 
employees to understand that they were doing that before and 
sustainable development was only to go a little bit further in the 
process.” 
 
 
(Plant director, n°52, case 
1) 
  
 “For us, it was not a real change. We have always been very careful 
about social and environmental issues. The good thing with 
sustainable development is that this work is now recognized by both 
external and internal actors.” 
 
 
 Then, the commitment to sustainable development did not fundamentally change the 
business model of the company. It only reinforces the company’s existing environmental 
policies (dictated mainly by the regulatory agencies).  Eco-efficiency is not the same as 
sustainable development and despite its commitment to environmental sustainability when it 
came to actual practice decisions were driven more by ‘efficiency’ then ‘eco’.   The new 
environmental reporting system was communicated to all stakeholder groups as part of a 
‘sustainable growth’ strategy.  The company’s environmental strategy was thus 
complemented by a stakeholder management strategy in an attempt to enhance the company’s 
social legitimacy.  The strategic focus was on the obstructive and passive stakeholders – to the 
former group they attempted to portray nuclear power as a clean energy source and to the 
latter they stressed the safety and risk management policies of the company to prevent any 
shift in public opinion.  Despite the affirmations of the triple bottom line approach in 
balancing economic, social and environmental issues to achieve ‘sustainable growth’ in 
practice the focus was on sustaining growth.  We will discuss two examples that illustrate 
how economic and profit motives continued to dominate decision making on environmental 
issues. 
 The first case involves toxic acid dumping.  Many subsidiaries use toxic acids in their 
production chain and produce substantial quantities of toxic waste.  One plant invested in 
R&D to identify ways to recycle toxic acid waste and developed an innovative process that 
allowed it to recycle 80% of the waste, which could be used for production.  This innovation 
was eco-efficient and led to significant reduction of toxic acids dumping.  However, two other 
plants that used similar toxic acids did not implement the recycling process but instead 
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constructed a chemical station where the waste was treated to reduce its toxicity before 
releasing the treated waste into the nearest river.  This process did not reduce the dumping of 
acid waste but only the level of its toxicity, which was sufficient to meet regulatory standards. 
When asked why the recycling process which their own company had developed was not used 
in all its plants managers cited high costs and inadequate returns on investment as the 
following quotes illustrate:    
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Laboratory coordinator, 
n°125, case 3) 
  
« Yes I know they did a great thing with their recycling process. 
Acids release is a real impact for our kind of plant. But we do not 
have enough acid release to invest in this process. It’s very expensive 
and it’s not interesting for us. Now, you’re right, it’s better to recycle 
but it will be always costly, from building to maintenance.” 
 
 
(Chemical station manager, 
n°123, case 3) 
  
 “I know this innovation, they retreat acids and reinsert it into the 
production process, aren’t they? Good. But here, it is not a priority. 
Too expensive and no real return on investment. We try to respect the 
law by mixing acids before releasing. But the process is not reliable, 
we still have problem with legal limits. I would be happy to have the 
same recycle process but they will never accept.” 
 
 
 So in essence the implementation of the recycling process is limited to plants where 
cost reductions can be achieved, otherwise conventional treatment of waste continues to be 
practiced.   
 Another plant manufactured a product that contained SF6, the most potent greenhouse 
gas with a global warming potential 22,200 times greater than carbon dioxide.  Corporate 
headquarters directed the plant to reduce gas emissions to be consistent with the company’s 
policy on clean energy and to comply with environmental regulation.  The plant responded by 
conducting a life cycle analysis of the product in an attempt to reduce the amount of gas used 
in the final product since no substitute existed.  However, in practice no real reductions 
resulted because of the difficulty to translate sustainability strategy into practice as explained 
by a technician:   
 
Respondents Illustrative Quotes 
 
(Technician, n°97b, case 2) 
  
 “We have more and more constraints. We must think to the product 
cycle of life and try to reach a 100% recycling. The group 
communicated a lot on this topic during the last years. We also 
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created an environmental guideline to conduct life cycle analysis on 
our products.” 
 
 
 The ‘constraints’ identified by the technician were really at the heart of the company’s 
environmental policy.  The life cycle approach widely promoted to their stakeholders as one 
of their company’s major environmental initiatives involved first asking each plant to identify 
toxic and polluting raw materials that would be used for life cycle analysis.  Then the 
engineering department was asked to come up with technological solutions and alternatives 
while taking into account environmental impacts over the life cycle of the products.  
However, the guidelines stipulated that life cycle comparisons could only be done on products 
that had similar costs.  If cheaper alternatives existed they were invariably preferred.  The 
company’s environmental manual stated:  
 
“ [The goal] is to conceive new products by minimizing their environmental 
impacts on environment if it is technically and economically feasible. […] 
Environmental criteria will be used to choose between two options that are 
technically and financially equivalent”. [Operational instructions for conception, 
case n°2) 
 
 Thus, in practice the use of life cycle analysis to assess the environmental impact of 
products and implement the company’s sustainable growth strategies privileged the 
environment only when it was ‘technically and economically’ prudent to do so.  While the 
engineers interviewed were all aware of the company’s new focus on sustainable development 
and the need for more sustainable products they also pointed out that ultimately their choice 
of raw materials was dictated by customer preferences and willingness to pay a premium for a 
less environmentally harmful processes:    
 
 
(Operator, n°92a, case 2) 
  
 “We use a greenhouse gas and each product is equipped with sensors 
that allow a constant control. But if there is a breakdown on a sensor, 
we need to change it and traditionally, we use to open the system and 
the gas escapes a little bit when changing the sensor. Now we put a 
valve on the sensor to be sure that the gas does not escape. But this is 
an option; customers have to pay more for that, so they do not 
systematically ask for this technology.” 
 
(New product manager, 
n°84, case 2) 
  
 “Sometime customers ask for environmental information when 
asking for a call of offers, but I must be honest, it is rare, they always 
look after the price firstly, no matter the environment will be 
impacted.” 
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 Some respondents even claimed that the company positioned some manufacturing 
changes as being environmentally motivated when in fact they were driven by cost concerns.  
Engineers were instructed to reduce costs by using less material and inputs in new product 
development.  The subsequent reduction in input was then claimed as an environmental 
improvement.  While there is nothing inherently wrong in this win-win approach using cost 
advantages as a primary motivator limits the extent of environmental improvements that are 
really possible as the following quotes illustrate: 
 
 
 
(Engineer, n°90, case 2) 
  
 “Taking into account environmental impacts remains theoretical. The 
environmental guideline mentions it but in practices, it is not the case. 
Technically, we have the logical to compare solutions in terms f 
environmental impacts. But, we don’t do it. Because of cost 
reduction, we always do better than before; there is less raw material, 
less expensive material, so it is good for environment and people 
around think that it is environmentally conceived. It is not true. We 
think in term of cost reduction and then there is a raw material 
consumption’s reduction, so it is always better than before. But if 
environment was really taking into account, I think that many thing 
could change.” 
 
(Vice plant director, n°80, 
case 2) 
  
 “The goal of conception (life cycle analysis) is to reduce the 
manufacturing price. That’s it.” 
 
(New product director, 
n°84, case 2) 
  
 “It won’t be honest to say that it is for sustainable development. We 
have the idea, we need to reduce manufacturing cost and we 
understood that it was in line with the corporate sustainable policy.” 
 
 
 Figure 1 describes managerial perceptions of stakeholders and the resultant corporate 
strategies.      
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Figure 1 
Stakeholders and corporate strategy. 
 
Discussion 
 Our analysis indicates that despite espoused claims about the transition to sustainable 
development there was no significant shift in the business model of the nuclear energy group 
we studied.  Environmental initiatives were invariable evaluated using traditional criteria cost 
reductions, efficiency gains and customer preferences.  Our findings are consistent with other 
empirical studies in other industries where the ultimately the economic bottom line 
determines the scope and extent of environmental and social initiatives (Banerjee, 2001; 
Banerjee, Iyer & Kashyap, 2003; Margolis & Walsh, 2003).  In this case strategic engagement 
with supportive stakeholders involved highlighting the business and growth opportunities of 
the nuclear industry because of rising concerns over greenhouse gas emissions.  In engaging 
with the passive stakeholders the company sought to reassure them of the safety risks of 
nuclear energy while also highlighting the ‘clean’ aspects of nuclear energy.  Obstructive 
stakeholders were presented with the company’s new sustainable development agenda 
publicizing their environmental and reporting initiatives, their commitment to reducing their 
environmental footprint and better technologies to reduce radioactive waste.  The strategy of 
‘sustainable growth’ was designed to please all stakeholders although the company was aware 
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of the potential for public opinion to shift, government policies to change and anti-nuclear 
voices becoming more strident and powerful.   
 However, sustainability in this case was very much restricted to a ‘win-win’ discourse 
although the reduction of environmental impact was minimal.  Win-win situations involving 
the environment and business are not so obvious and frequent (Banerjee, 2007).  Attracted by 
cost reduction, production efficiency and new markets, companies commit to environmental 
strategy and are soon confronted with dilemmas.  Green management can be very expensive; 
re-treatment station buildings, recycling process implementation or R&D investment involve 
significant costs. Moreover, managers have to make technological choices between 
environmental efficiencies and costs.  If cost reduction is the corporation’s key motivation to 
implement green management managers will tend to choose the cheaper solution despite of its 
lower environmental efficacy.  Our analysis suggests that the firm we studied committed to 
environmental issues in order to benefit from the business opportunities coming from 
sustainable development.  In areas where business interests coincided with environmental 
improvements, the firm’s developed and implemented environmental strategies.   
 The sustainable growth strategy in the case we studied was really a sustaining growth 
strategy.  It was about leveraging current concerns about greenhouse gas emissions to 
expanding the use of nuclear power by promoting it as a clean source of energy while 
alleviating public concerns about safety.  The growth strategy was further reinforced by 
assessing environmental initiatives by economical and technical criteria and only allowing 
those initiatives that do not increase costs to be implemented.  There was no meaningful 
attempt to redefine the company’s business based on the sustainability agenda.  Despite low 
key (and ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to invest in the renewable energy sector the 
company saw itself as a nuclear energy provider and sought to expand their operations world 
wide.  What is interesting in this case is that the company’s majority shareholder is the French 
government who vetoed any attempts by management to invest in renewable energy because 
it was too costly and impractical.  Thus, in the current political economy economic growth 
and expansion is privileged over environmental and social concerns whether it is by a 
multinational corporation seeking to enhance shareholder wealth or a publicly owned 
company seeking to expand its profits and revenues.  Wealth is created and revenues are 
generated not through sustainable growth but by sustaining growth.  The company’s major 
goal of ‘reducing consumption’ for each plant per unit of output will not reduce 
environmental impacts in any meaningful way because any reduction will be nullified by 
increased output and sales as the industry expands.   
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 While the study has obvious limitations in terms of its generalizability of findings 
from a single case study it does highlight the limitations of the enlightened self-interest view 
of sustainable development by showing that business interests are the primary driver of 
environmental strategies and that there is no fundamental change in the traditional business 
model when it comes to addressing sustainability challenges.  Business opportunities linked to 
green management have been widely promoted in the literature (Porter et al., 2001; 
Wiedemann-goiran, Perier, & Lépineux, 2003).  Both in the business and academic press 
there are scores of articles that exhort all businesses to embrace sustainable development 
because not only can such an approach save the planet it can also improve the company’s 
financial and economic position.  These writers predict that by becoming environmentally 
responsible firms can leverage competitive advantage, generate cost savings through process-
oriented green management and build a good corporate reputation. 
 However, some caution must be advocated for the promotional campaign for 
sustainability in business firms.  Our analysis shows that self-regulation based upon business 
interests can fail in achieving the goal of sustainability. Corporations will not escape from an 
economic logic and will apply the same business models to sustainability.  More research is 
needed to understand the long-term effects of a particular environmental initiative.  Most 
research has focused on the win-win cases of environmentalism.  Once the low hanging fruit 
of energy efficiencies, waste reduction and recycling are picked, companies are confronted 
with environmental initiatives that no longer provide immediate economic and financial 
benefits.  How do managers’ negotiate tradeoffs in a win-lose situation?  What are the 
decision-making criteria that are used?  How are these communicated to external and internal 
stakeholders?  We need more research that highlights decision-making processes in trade off 
situations.   
 Our findings have some implications for change in the nuclear power industry.  First, 
it shows that nuclear power corporations are highly constrained by external stakeholders.  
Direct engagement with the corporation by obstructive stakeholders may be less effective than 
attempts to convert passive stakeholders to take a stronger stance against the expansion of the 
nuclear sector.  Second, the geopolitical context of nuclear energy is a significant factor for 
the future of the industry.  Recent trends in European elections indicate a shift in the political 
climate with green parties making inroads in the European Parliament and in several countries 
in Europe.  Green parties won 53 seats in the European Parliament and increased its 
representation from 5.5% to 7.2% in the assembly.  Increasing political power among green 
parties could well see significant policy shifts away from nuclear energy to renewable energy 
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sources.  Ultimately how these stakeholder dynamics play out in the political economy will 
determine the direction of the nuclear energy industry. 
 The planet finds itself at a cross roads in terms of developing sustainable energy 
solutions.  Much of the attention is focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
conventional energy sources.  And despite the rhetoric both investment and technological 
developments in renewables are modest and limited in scope.  How the energy industry is 
governed remains one of the most crucial challenges of sustainable development.  Our 
findings indicate that green regulation matters more than green management in developing 
policies for environmental protection.  Future research can explore new forms of legislation 
involving both ‘hard’ laws that corporations have to comply with and ‘soft’ laws or codes of 
conduct, environmental standards, environmental and social audits.  While ‘soft’ forms of 
regulation are discretionary perhaps constant monitoring and scrutiny of corporate 
environmental impact by civil society actors can serve as another form of regulatory pressure 
that compels companies to make meaningful progress towards environmental protection.  
Thus, what is needed is not just green management but green governance involving the active 
participation of market, state and civil society actors to ensure that corporations do not stray 
from the path towards sustainability. 
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